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SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 58 (Aug. 2, 2018) (en banc)1 
 
PROPERTY LAW: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS PROCEDURES FOR NOTICE 
 
Summary  
 
 The Court determined that prior to its 2015 amendment, NRS § 116.31168, through its 
incorporation of NRS § 107.090, previously required homeowner associations to provide notices 
of default and sale to all persons and entities with a subordinate interest in the property, 
regardless of whether they had requested notice. 
 
Background  
 
 In 2010, former homeowners received a notice of delinquent assessments, notice of 
default, and an election to sell from appellant Star Hill Homeowners Association, after being 
delinquent on their homeowners’ association fees. In 2012, per NRS Chapter 116, Star Hill held 
a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and transferred the property to SBW Investment Inc. who 
subsequently transferred title to appellant SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC. In the deed, Star Hill 
affirmed that it had adhered to all statutory notice requirements.  
 
 Respondent, Bank of New York Mellon, brought suit against Star Hill and SFR in the 
federal district court of Nevada. The bank alleged that the foreclosure sale was void because it 
violated due process requirements under NRS Chapter 116 and as a result, the sale had not 
negated the Bank’s deed of trust. Pursuant to the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure 5, the 
United States District Court for the District of Nevada filed a certified question order with the 
Supreme Court of Nevada seeking an answer as to whether NRS § 116.31168 before its 2015 
amendment required homeowner’s associations to provide notices of default and sale to all 
persons and entities who held a subordinate interest in the property.2 
  
Discussion  
 
Prior to its 2015 amendment, NRS § 116.31168 was ambiguous.3 Although the statute 
incorporated the foreclosure notice requirements of NRS § 107.090, it did not express whether it 
meant to incorporate NRS § 107.090’s provisions in its entirety.4 Although NRS § 116.31168 
originally only required homeowner associations seeking foreclosure to give notice to mortgage 
lenders who “opted-in” to receive such notice, NRS § 107.090 required notice to be given to all 
persons and entities whose interests were subordinate to the property and the homeowners’ 
association lien.5 NRS § 116.31168 incorporated NRS § 107.090 without any language limiting 
its incorporation and thus intended to have all provisions of NRS § 107.090 incorporated.6 
                                                     
1 By Jocelyn Murphy. 
2 NEV. R. APP. P  5; NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.31168 (1993). 
3 NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.31168(1) (1993). 
4 NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.090 (2009). 
5 NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.31168 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.090 (2009). 
6 NEV. REV. STAT. § 116.31168 (1993). 
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In Bourne Valley, the Ninth Circuit held that incorporation of NRS § 107.090 would 
render NRS § 116.31168’s opt-in provisions superfluous.7 However, total incorporation would 
not render the statute superfluous because NRS § 107.090 only requires notice to be given to 
parties of subordinate interests. NRS §116.31168’s opt-in provision allows others who do not fall 
within this specific category to request notice although they are not entitled to it under due 
process. Additionally, use of the language “requests” for notices in NRS § 116.31168’s title and 
subsections also does not limit NRS § 107.090’s incorporation. The title does not negate the 
statutes past express mandatory notice requirements.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Prior to the 2015 amendment of NRS § 116.31168 through the statutes incorporation of 
NRS § 107.090, homeowner associations were required to provide notices of default and sale to 
all persons and entities with a subordinate interest in the property. The Court held that notice was 
required to be given even if a party had not previously requested notice be given. 
 
 
                                                     
7 Bourne Valley Court Trust v. Wells Fargo Bank, 832 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2016). 
